Abstract. Abstract. During the previous three decades, mutual financial firms have been experiencing a process of demutualization, and some of the non-for-profit banks have become publicly listed companies. Hence, the persistence of the Spanish Savings Banks constitutes an interesting case study. In line with recent literature, this paper attempts to reach a better understanding of the factors that have contributed to the persistence of these entities in the long run and to the maintenance of a very specific model of corporate governance. Regulatory influences, politics and political institutions have proved to be key elements of a model which has proved capable of delivering successful outcomes in increasingly competitive conditions. Nonetheless, the financial crisis would seem to have exacerbated the stresses and strains within this model and, in combination with the pressure of increasingly globalized markets, the Spanish Savings Banks find themselves in a new scenario.
Introduction
In the 1980s and 1990s there was an intense process of financial deregulation. On the one hand, there was the demutualization of the building societies, life insurers and general insurers. On the other, some of the non-for-profit banks became PLC's. These institutions included the trustee savings banks in Great Britain and the casse di risparmio in Italy, while in France the caisses d'epargne merged to form a single cooperative group. These transformations had a strong impact on the structure of the market, on the competitiveness of the financial industry and on the behaviour and performance of financial firms in general. In the cases cited above, the intense regulatory change affected the type of property and the corporate governance of these organizations. This phenomenon was global in nature and various countries and continents were affected including, of course, Europe, but also, North America and Australia. For more than a century, many of these financial firms had played an important role in the insurance and banking industries and hence, it should not be surprising that these processes have awakened such intense interest in researchers, policy makers and those working in the industry.
Along these lines, the insurance industry has also provoked much interest, and even more so in recent times, since the firms working within the sector are mutual or stock companies with long histories behind them. 1 However, the central thesis offered by this paper involves banking. In the banking industry not-for-profit firms also compete with for-profit organizations. As Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale show, the industries where the two types of firm compete are particularly interesting when it comes to corporate governance. 2 These are some of the features that characterize the Spanish case. The cajas de ahorros (hereafter savings banks) became totally integrated in the financial system without losing their status as not-for-profit firms and, at the same time, maintaining the basic features of their corporate governance. The financial reforms began in earnest at the end of the 1970s but the savings banks maintained their sectorial status. The persistence of their peculiar form of governance structure constitutes an interesting case for study, particularly since the current financial crisis appears to be curtailing this historical continuity.
On the one hand this paper attempts to facilitate a better understanding of the factors that have contributed to the longevity of this model of organization and the maintenance of a very special form of corporate governance. On the other, it analyses why the model, which has been capable of delivering successful outcomes in increasingly competitive conditions, has finally succumbed to the pressure of increasingly globalized markets. This analysis is based on historical evidence and a close look at the literature which has tended to focus on the insurance industry.
The savings banks in Europe were entities that were established in order to capture savings. This set them apart from the credit cooperatives and other mutual banks which aimed to provide better access to credit for their associates. 3 The savings banks, because they were non-profit entities, financed their capital via donations and adopted this institutional set up precisely in order to protect their 'commercial' clients, that is, their depositors. This occurred simply because the donations only took place at the outset of the savings banks' activity. Subsequently they became 'commercial nonprofit' institutions. As Henry Hansmann indicates, 'the savings bank industry is unusually interesting: it is a unique clear example of an industry in which nonprofits arose, from the beginning, primarily as a response to asymmetric information on the part of paying customer rather than to protect donors or other third-party payors (such as the government)'. 4 Numerous authors agree that the emergence of not-for-profit and mutual firms was a response to situations of serious market failures. Specifically, the savings banks appeared as a consequence of problems related to asymmetric information, in contrast to some mutual insurance companies (property and liability insurance), which appeared as a kind of protection against specific oligopolistic structures. 5 Within this framework, one of the key factors in the long term was the impact that the changes in the regulatory structure had on these entities. The persistence of institutions like the savings banks obliges the analyst to consider the role played by regulation in the control of the financial system and, as a result of this influence, just how these organisations responded to these stimuli. 6 Mark Casson suggests that the organisational structure adopted by firms may be analysed as though this were a rational response to information costs. As these costs change, the pressure exerted obliges the intermediaries to adapt and, in consequence, organisational change takes place. 7 This model has been successfully used by Monica J.
Keneley as a means of analysing the demutualization of life insurers in Australia during the 1990s. 8 The present paper considers the role of regulation from the same perspective, that is, as a factor that restricts or distorts the way the market behaves. By extension this model can also explain the evolution of firms that are subject to specific property and governance structures. 9 However, one other factor that cannot be ignored within the framework of a long run analysis, a factor which is closely linked to institutional criteria, is the role of politics and political institutions. Douglass C. North and Mary M. Shirley have recently underlined the overwhelming influence of politics and political institutions as determinants of financial development. 10 Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn highlight that it is these factors, within the broader context of regulation, that are relevant for corporate governance. They situate features of this scenario within the framework of the political system whereas other authors have done so within the context of the 'legal family'. 11 Stephen Haber looks at the role of the political framework and compares the financial systems of the US and Mexico. He studies the long term success or failure of policies that attempt to restrict competition via banking law and finds that this depended, to a large extent, on the degree of openness of the political system itself. The approach taken by these authors in considering the intensity of the relationships between political institutions and financial development creates a highly consistent framework for analysing the case in hand. Consequently, section two looks briefly at the history of savings banks. Section three analyses the ownership structure of Spanish savings banks in order to highlight certain features of analytical importance. Section four studies regulatory influences during the interwar period. Section five compares the contradictions that exist between the systems of corporate governance administered during the dictatorial political regime and the evolution of same during the democracy. Section six offers some concluding remarks.
Brief historical background
This work has been carried out within the framework of leading economic research into A process of amalgamation reduced the number of these entities to 45 independent savings banks in 2008. 20 In the last thirty years, using CECA as hub, the savings banks have managed to integrate the additional burdens of increased costs and the risk of profit reinvestment with enough efficiency. 
Savings banks, ownership and why it matters
There would appear to be some confusion within the literature when it comes to changing the profile of these entities dramatically, since they facilitate the conversion of the savings banks into commercial banks using the participation of private capital.
The fact that the savings banks had no proprietors as such and no inalienable property rights is important for two reasons. Firstly, these factors conditioned the structure of their organs of governance and secondly, they were important because these features have remained intact over a long period of time. The structure and composition of the organs of governance of each savings bank were freely defined by its own statutes. 25 The role of certain private individuals in the formation process of the savings banks was clearly reflected in the case of the Jumilla (Murcia) savings bank, created in 1901. In the presentation of their statutes it was stated that:
'In order to carry out certain improvements for the benefit of the people, the official protection of funds is not absolutely necessary. Similarly, financial support from the State or provincial or municipal authorities is not absolutely necessary. When there is the capacity to put into action a country's living forces and elements, all that is required is private initiative.'
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In other cases, in spite of the fact that there were savings banks that came into existence under the protection of the local authorities, the statutes made it clear that the citizens chosen to form part of the banks' governing bodies should be completely independent. The San Sebastián savings bank, created in 1879 is a good example:
'This establishment was legally considered to be an association created and regulated by and through the City Council, by the free will of the persons taking part and with the funds it obtains through loans, deposits and other means which will be explained in the following sections.' 27 Within this context it is difficult to find relevant, broad-ranging statistics, but, it may be possible to generalise without inordinate speculation. The structure of the governing bodies of the savings banks has been made up of the bank's founders, local authorities, and a swathe of representative groups (professionals, local businessmen, priests and savings banks employees and depositors). This basic composition was reflected in the organs of governance, via which the vacant posts were covered by a system in which the board voted to designate who was to occupy a given seat. This is one of the characteristics of the non-profit firms whose boards of directors are essentially self-appointing. 28 The peculiarities inherent in each case were the consequence of the statutory self-governance that characterized the savings banks. With respect to the number of organs of governance, the nineteenth century tradition seems to have established two: a supervisory organ, normally the assembly, and the board of directors. The structure of the Assembly was usually reflected in that of the Board. 29 The members of board, since they have no effective property rights, are unable gain access to the surplus that might accumulate due to the successful administration of the organization. The way in which residual earnings had to be distributed was not organs of governance did have the power to control the running of the organization. The variety of the groups that had a presence within these organs of governance brings us back to the idea of stakeholders. In the case of the savings banks, agency problems and the focus of shareholder value 30 have little relevance to companies in which these factors do not exist and, the stakeholder approach, while having many advantages, lacks theoretical maturity. 31 It must be admitted that the wealth of literature on corporate governance increasingly takes into account the participation of workers, clients and suppliers within the government of the organizations, together with the traditional governance of owners and managers or directors. Consequently, from this point of view, savings banks might be considered as providing a model for an alternative way of organising businesses. 32 The managerial system adopted by the savings banks in the nineteenth century was very simple. The board of directors directly controlled the banking staff. It was, in effect, a functional structure which did not differentiate between controlling and executive bodies. Business activity was administered from a single office which was divided into two sections: the savings section (deposits) and the loans section (monte de piedad). 33 The framework, within which the savings banks were run, characterised fundamentally by flows of asymmetric information, effectively solved the problems of administering residual control rights and managed to bypass problems that might have arisen because of the absence of an ownership structure. The potential costs of monitoring the staff were reduced via the use of two instruments. 34 On the one hand, the central office manager took part in the board's debates, but he did not have a vote. The second of these instruments was a device by which one member of the board was placed in charge of the operational activity of the central office each week according to a rota -'the appointed member for the week'.
Another direct consequence of the fact that the savings banks had no owners was a lack of capital. This was an endemic feature of entities that operated as 'commercial non-profits' however, in the case of the savings banks, their commercial activity was limited, since their only means of obtaining capital came from the accumulation of reserves. Essentially, it was this that set them apart from the rest of their non-profit counterparts. These organisations were capable of accumulating large surpluses (endowments) that allowed them to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of the market. 35 Consequently, the savings banks had to rely on other means of protection in order to subsist in the long term. The historical evidence highlights the extent of the impact of a protective regulation in each of the political periods of both the last and the present century.
Late regulatory influences
Until the 1920s, there was no consistent regulation of the savings banks industry. At this juncture, the regulatory stimulus began to be characterised by profound changes in institutional and political arenas as a consequence of the establishment of the General Primo de Ribera dictatorship (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) Within this framework, there were new regulatory developments that affected the savings banks and the banks. The culmination of this process took place after the fall of the monarchy within the republican period (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) .
Prior to these legislative changes, from the end of the nineteenth century, the savings banks were progressively diversifying. The most forward-thinking savings banks opted to promote a share portfolio and, subsequently, more innovative credit products. Mortgages were slowly introduced by some Spanish savings banks. Later, during the first third of the twentieth century, numerous savings banks decided to reinforce this credit activity by increasing mortgage lending, loans against promissory notes, by offering new deposit products such as fixed term savings accounts and current accounts. 37 The Catalonian savings banks, particularly the Caja de Pensiones de Barcelona and Sabadell, and the Basque and Galician savings banks, together with some of those from Andalusia, Valencia and Aragon used this strategy in order to diversify its clientele. 38 The profile of the savings banks, as described by Henry Hansmann, as the only place where the poor could deposit their savings, 39 ceased to be an accurate description in the 1930s. In short, the savings banks were reducing financial exclusion by providing financial services to the working classes and to other social sectors, services which the commercial banks were not prepared to offer them. These features, linked to the fact that the savings banks were local in nature, and non-profit orientated, explains why their clientele were so faithful.
Spanish banking changed significantly in the first decades of the twentieth century. On the one hand, commercial banks became more efficient before WW1 as a result of increased competitiveness, 40 Table 1 presents the structure of a significant sample of those social groups that backed the savings banks which existed in 1900 and 1927. It is interesting to highlight the importance of private individuals and associations and, in consequence, the secondary role of public institutions, in both of the years cited. Between these two dates, the percentage fall in the weight of private owners (aristocracy, yeomen, industrialists and merchants) within the group of banking promoters was offset by a comparable increase in the numbers of cultural associations and unions. As a result, it may be affirmed that most of the savings banks that came into existence prior to the Spanish Civil War, were deeply rooted in the civil society and were characterized by a private ethos inherent in their foundational philosophy. These characteristics might lead us to suppose that they define, albeit somewhat generically, the social base of the savings banks, which were made up of those interested parties that participated in their governance. A closer look reveals the relative paucity of weight that the public administrations held in the composition of these bodies.
As a result of business diversification, a new executive organ was introduced which acted as an intermediary between the board of directors and the central office, which was somewhat similar to an executive board. From that time onwards, the board of directors was to meet only once a year for its Annual General Meeting and for audit purposes. However, the principal factor in fomenting increased managerial dynamism was the professionalization of the central office manager (henceforth the chief executive officer, CEO), who became a salaried figure with a contract and statutory executive powers. 45 The accentuation of the business profile of the savings banks generated increasingly serious agency problems derived, specifically, from their particular property structure. There was much confusion between the organs of control and those of executive management in the Spanish savings banks. This set the pattern for the idiosyncratic nature of the governance structure of the savings banks for the subsequent decades. 46 It was only a regulatory framework which restricted competition and segmented the banking market which subsequently allowed the savings banks to carry out their activity without duress.
Political drivers of corporate governance after the Spanish civil war
The end of the civil war was followed by a sharp rise in the severity of financial regulation. Table 2 of the savings banks' statutes, as indeed was the length of their tenure. 50 Further, a governmental decree was passed which allowed the state to appropriate a proportion of the savings banks' profits. These funds went to create the "National Social Dividend" (Obra Social Nacional) which was freely administered by the State. During the Franco years, the government procured 15 per cent of those savings banks' profits which, according to the Statute of 1933, should have been used for its own social dividend. 51 Secondly, there was a move to set up new savings banks under the tutelage of public administration. Table 1 Table 3 for regulatory details). 52 {please place Table 3 which is lower than one third. 54 Some entities have developed a more diversified representative structure in their governance bodies. As is the case of the 'La Caixa', one of the foremost savings entities in the country, one means of doing so would involve reducing public participation (21 per cent) and by augmenting the presence of cultural and social institutions. With respect to business participation, there also appears to have been strong politicization in the decision taking of the savings banks through the influence of regional governments. Sometimes this influence has manifested itself in a push to ensure that certain projects remain within the regional territory and, in others, by supporting certain rescue packages. 55 The Spanish case reflected certain critical aspects that affect corporate governance in a stakeholder regime. Without doubt, the structure of the organs of governance means that the risk of politicization will remain. The legislation initiated during the democratic regime was not capable of preventing the growing participation of public administrations, probably as a consequence of the inertia of the Franco period, which served to dampen the tradition of the savings banks as independent depoliticised entities. There are many contradictions that arise during this period. Firstly, it would appear to be logical that the regional governments, which have supervisory powers,
should not have administrative powers as well, since this would establish a glaring conflict of interests. Secondly, much of the decision making process undertaken by public administration representatives became politicized. As some authors claim, the risk management derived from these decisions affects the stakeholder system and, as a result, it should be the interested parties who set out to debate the underlying implications of these policies. 56 Thirdly, there remained the problem of how to control the managers? In this regard, it would almost certainly be prudent to introduce an element of market dynamics within the savings banks' organs of governance and to increase the number of stakeholders. 57 These latent contradictions within the savings banks' system of governance became more acute as the savings banks grew through a period of successive mergers and an expansionist policy that protected them from the competition of the commercial banks (for an indication of the asymmetry between them, see Table 3 ). Figure 1 shows how from the 1980's onwards the savings banks increased their market quota until this reached more than half of all of the total deposits in the financial system in a period of spectacular growth. 58 This expansion has revealed a new problem inherent in the savings bank system, namely that, in an ever more competitive and open environment, they find it difficult to find capital and are harshly exposed to the pressures of the markets.
{please place Table 4 near here}   Table 4 provides a long term view of the evolution and structure of the main components of the savings banks' capital. Together with the growth in capital and reserves, the increase in the savings banks' volume of trade has obliged these institutions to incorporate new capital instruments which are distinct from the shares issued by companies with a traditional property structure. 59 The instrument that has done most to providing the savings banks with permanent resources has been that of subordinated financing, which has swiftly grown to approach the levels occupied by which is still a green paper, aims to carry out radical changes affecting their structure as non-profits by allowing the entry of private capital.
Conclusions
Historical evidence reveals two quite remarkable features of the Spanish Savings Banks. There was a kind of regulatory favouritism that tended to create a kind of dichotomy that placed banks and savings banks in markets that were relatively isolated from each other. Perhaps the greatest changes occurred after 1947. It was at this time when, via the introduction of second order norms, that the savings banks found themselves subject to powerful restrictions with regard to their organs of governance. Effectively, these organs came under the control of the state, and the restrictions seriously hampered structures which had, up until that moment, been deeply entrenched within the civil society and which contained an important democratic component.
The modernization process and the deregulation which took place after the restoration of democracy were incapable of eliminating the barriers to entry that affected the whole of the banking sector. These criteria offer an interesting insight into the strength of the inertia that certain regulatory impacts have in the long run. The new regulations homologated the operational procedures of both the banks and the savings banks, which competed with each other in the same markets using their own products and networks, but which remained quite distinct with respect to their property and governance structures. In the savings banks, the idiosyncratic nature of these features served to accentuate the politicization and lack of control of the managerial boards. As a consequence, regulatory change did not lead to any substantial changes in information costs. 61 This scenario is in contrast with the cases of demutualization in the Australian insurance industry, analyzed by Keneley, which went through a profound process of deregulation. This is because the system maintained at least some of the asymmetry that . 62 These entities demonstrated a greater capacity to adapt and generally operated much more closely in line with market standards (the efficiency of the boards as supervisory bodies, greater transparency, and less politicization). However, the financial crisis, which began in 2008, meant that the problems mentioned above became an intolerable deadweight for the savings banks as a whole.
In short, the regulatory favouritism which some authors ascribe to the legislative treatment received by these not-for-profits Banks, 63 
